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MATERIALITY IMMATERIAL?
REVISITING STANDARDS FOR
SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS
CERTIFICATION IN
AMGEN V. CONNECTICUT
RETIREMENT PLANS AND TRUST
FUNDS
NANCY MY NGUYEN
I. INTRODUCTION
In the world of private securities fraud litigation, class certification
is the million-dollar question. Nearly twenty-five years ago in the
1
landmark decision Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court
revolutionized the landscape for securities litigation. By endorsing a
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, the Court armed
securities fraud plaintiffs with a vital tool critical to bypassing the
previously insurmountable hurdle of establishing class-wide
2
reliancea necessary element of securities fraud class actions. In
recent years, private securities fraud claims have experienced
increasing judicial scrutiny; the Roberts Court alone has generated
more securities fraud precedent in two years than the Supreme Court
3
has generated in the previous two decades.


J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor James D. Cox
for his valuable guidance throughout my research. I thank Andrew Hand and Boris Rappoport
for their thoughtful feedback and contributions.
1. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
2. See id. at 242 (“Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the
proposed plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a
class action, since individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”); see also
Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV.
151, 179 (“Basic was a boon to plaintiffs, leading to a rapid increase in the number of fraud-onthe-market suits after 1988—the number of filings had already tripled by 1991, and continued to
rise dramatically over the next fifteen years.”).
3. Robert F. Carangelo, et al., The 10b-5 Guide: A Survey of 2010-2011 Securities Fraud
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Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
offers the Roberts Court yet another opportunity to shape securities
fraud jurisprudence by further defining class certification standards.
Amgen will require the Court to consider whether plaintiffs must
prove materiality before invoking Basic’s fraud-on-the-market
5
presumption of reliance at the class certification stage. Because of
Amgen’s far-reaching implications on the future of shareholder class
actions, it has the potential to set one of the most critical securities
precedents since Basic.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Basic and The Fraud-on-the-Market Presumption of Reliance
Amgen’s case before the Supreme Court concerns the materiality
6
and reliance elements of SEC Rule 10b-5 securities fraud claims. A
plaintiff must show that a defendant’s misrepresentation concerned a
material fact, and that a plaintiff relied on the misrepresented
7
material fact in deciding whether to buy or sell the company’s stock.
To prove a fact’s materiality, a plaintiff must establish that “there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
8
[the misrepresented fact] important” before deciding to trade. The
plaintiff must then prove the element of reliance: he must show that
he actually relied upon the material fact before deciding to engage in
9
the transaction that would ultimately lead to his injury.
Before Basic, putative plaintiff classes alleging securities fraud
faced a roadblock under the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil
10
Procedure 23(b)(3) that they establish reliance on a class-wide basis.

Litigation,
WEIL,
GOTSHAL
&
MANGES
LLP
(September
17,
2012),
http://www.weil.com/files/upload/10b-5_Guide.pdf (comparing the six securities fraud cases
decided between 2010 and 2011 with the five cases decided between 1994 and 2008).
4. Amgen, Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085 (U.S.
argued Nov. 5, 2012).
5. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Amgen, No. 11-1085 (U.S. Mar. 1, 2012).
6. Rule 10b-5 is promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the
rulemaking authority granted to it by Congress in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2012)).
7. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 554 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
8. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (adopting, for the context of Rule
10b-5 claims, the framework for determining materiality provided by TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
9. See id. at 243 (“Reliance provides the requisite causal connection between a
defendant’s misrepresentation and a plaintiff’s injury.”).
10. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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To prevail on a securities fraud claim, a plaintiff must show a causal
connection between a company’s alleged misrepresentation and his
11
injury. In face-to-face transactions, this is accomplished through a
showing that an investor-plaintiff’s subjective pricing of a company’s
stock, based on information the investor had from the company,
12
affected his decision to buy or sell the company’s stock. But to
proceed as a class, plaintiffs need to show that common questions of
law or fact predominate over questions particular to individual
13
plaintiffs. The certification problem is thus particularly acute for
plaintiffs trading in an open market because individual investors may
14
not be aware of statements or misstatements a company made.
Instead, investors rely on the market to perform the valuation process
of securities based on all available information, disrupting the direct
15
link between the company and the investor. Thus, a showing of
common individualized reliance on a company’s alleged
misrepresentations would be an unrealistic evidentiary burden for
16
plaintiffs trading in an open and impersonal securities market.
Confronted with the rigorous requirements of class certification
and the need for judicial efficiency, Basic adopted a pragmatic
solution to solve the reliance problem for plaintiffs seeking class
treatment. Out of “considerations of fairness, public policy, . . .
probability, [and] judicial economy,” and in the interest of facilitating
Rule 10b-5 litigation, the Basic Court relied in part on a new
hypothesis of “efficient capital markets” to advance its innovative
17
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. The theory posits that
in an efficient market, the price of a security reflects all material
18
public information about that security. This assumption gives rise to
the rebuttable presumption that investors, relying on the integrity of
the market-set price, indirectly rely on any material
misrepresentations absorbed into the market price at the time they

11. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
12. Id.
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (stating that a class action may be maintained if the “court
finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members”).
14. Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. L.
829, 840 (2006).
15. Basic, 485 U.S. at 244.
16. Fox, supra note 14, at 839–40.
17. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245–46 (explaining the efficient capital markets hypothesis).
18. See id. at 244 (“[The market is] the unpaid agent of the investor, informing him that
given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the market price.”).
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19

decide to buy or sell a stock. Because this holds true for any
purchaser or seller of company stock during the putative class period,
plaintiffs may establish reliance on a class-wide basis, with the class
encapsulating all persons who traded after the alleged
misrepresentations were made.
Although the Court intended to aid putative plaintiff classes by
adopting the fraud-on-the-market presumption, it did not leave future
defendants helpless. The Basic Court cautioned that this presumption
20
of reliance is just that—a presumption. The Court acknowledged
that “[a]ny showing that severs the link between the alleged
misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by plaintiff,
or his decision to trade at a fair market price, will be sufficient to
21
rebut the presumption of reliance.” In sum, Basic established that
plaintiffs may invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption to secure
class certification, but defendants must be afforded the opportunity to
rebut this presumption.
B. Basic’s Aftermath and Rule 10b-5 Class Certification
Lower courts wrestling with Basic’s class certification framework
have relied on two Supreme Court cases that address presumptive
reliance and Rule 23 certification standards. In June of 2011, a
22
unanimous Court held in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton that
plaintiffs do not need to prove loss causation to trigger the fraud-on23
the-market presumption for the purposes of class certification. The
Court reasoned that loss causation has no bearing on whether an
24
investor directly or presumptively relied on a misrepresentation.
Basic requires proof that the misrepresentations were reflected in the
25
market price at the time of transaction. Thus, investors are presumed
to rely on the misrepresentations by simply deciding to transact—
26
what the Court refers to as “transaction causation.” By contrast, loss
causation requires proof that the misrepresentations reflected in the

19. Id. at 247.
20. See id. at 248 (enumerating several ways in which defendants can rebut the
presumption of reliance).
21. Id.
22. 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
23. Id. at 2186.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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market price also caused subsequent economic loss. Notably, the
Court avoided considering the respondent’s argument that
Halliburton was about price impact; that is, the effect of a
28
misrepresentation on market price. The Court kept its decision
narrow, holding that loss causation is not required to invoke Basic’s
presumption of reliance because the two involve different sets of
29
evidentiary facts. The Court left open the question of whether the
fraud-on-the-market presumption requires a showing of price
30
impact.
Just two weeks after Halliburton, the Court issued its decision in
31
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. While Dukes arose from an
employment discrimination claim, courts and litigants in securities
fraud class actions have relied on Dukes’s explanation of what Rule
32
23 requires from courts and putative classes before certification. The
Dukes Court held that the class certification inquiry requires district
courts to apply a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether the
prerequisites of Rule 23 are satisfied—even if such analysis requires
33
the court to trudge into the merits of the action. Dukes identifies
securities fraud class actions as an example where courts must
34
consider a merits question during certification proceedings. The
Court noted that investors must provide evidence of market efficiency
before invoking Basic’s presumption that all investors relied on the
35
accuracy of a company’s public statements.
Shadowing this string of Supreme Court precedent, circuit courts
have seen an increase in litigation over class certification standards.
These cases have highlighted the significant uncertainty related to the
predicates necessary to trigger Basic’s fraud-on-the-market
36
presumption for class certification.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 2187 (disagreeing with the respondent’s interpretation of the issues in the
court below and expressly declining to reach the respondent’s theory that “if a
misrepresentation does not affect market price, an investor cannot be said to have relied on the
misrepresentation merely because he purchased stock at that price”).
29. Id. at 2186–87.
30. Id. at 2187.
31. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
32. See, e.g., In re Am. Int’l Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 689 F.3d 229, 237–38 (2d Cir. 2012)
(relying on the Dukes standard to review a class certification denial in a securities fraud action).
33. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (“Frequently that ‘rigorous analysis’ will entail some
overlap with the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim. That cannot be helped.”).
34. Id. at 2552 n.6.
35. Id.
36. Compare In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2008)

NGUYEN FINALIZED 2 (DO NOT DELETE)

160

1/29/2013 12:04 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

[VOL. 8

III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendants-Petitioners are Amgen, Inc. and its principal officers.
Amgen is a publicly traded company and one of the largest
biotechnology companies in the world. Amgen is particularly well
known for commercializing two major pharmaceutical products:
37
“Epogen” and “Aranesp.” Both Epogen and Aranesp are drugs that
stimulate the formation of red blood cells in order to treat various
38
types of anemia.
Plaintiff-Respondent Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust
Funds represents a class of purchasers who bought Amgen’s publicly
39
traded securities between April 22, 2004, and May 10, 2007. On
October 1, 2007, Connecticut Retirement brought a securities fraud
action against Amgen in the Central District of California, alleging
that Amgen made a series of materially false and misleading
statements and omissions regarding Epogen and Aranesp in violation
40
of Rule 10b-5.
Connecticut Retirement alleges that Amgen made four types of
actionable misstatements in its earnings calls and conferences starting
41
on April 22, 2004. Connecticut Retirement claims that these
misstatements and omissions artificially inflated Amgen’s stock price
until May 10, 2007, when corrective disclosures allegedly caused the
42
stock price to plummet. Connecticut Retirement moved to certify its
class action on behalf of all purchasers of Amgen stock between the
date of the first actionable misstatement and the date of the
43
corrective disclosures.

(holding that plaintiffs must prove materiality for the presumption of reliance to apply), and In
re PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 n.11 (1st Cir. 2005) (stating in dictum that
plaintiffs must prove materiality at class certification), with In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d
623, 631 (3d Cir. 2011) (not requiring plaintiffs to prove materiality to invoke Basic’s
presumption), and Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
materiality is not one of “those aspects of the merits that affect the decisisons essential under
Rule 23”).
37. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 4.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1085).
41. Connecticut Retirement alleges that Amgen made material misrepresentations
regarding (1) FDA safety concerns; (2) clinical trials involving Aranesp; (3) the safety of the
drugs’ on-label usages; and (4) Amgen’s marketing practices. Id. at 1172–73.
42. Id. at 1173.
43. Id.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) provides the process for
44
class certification. The Rule requires a certifying court to find that
questions of law or fact common to all class members predominate
45
over individual questions. The District Court for the Central District
of California ruled that the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) were
satisfied because Connecticut Retirement successfully invoked the
fraud-on-the-market presumption, thus establishing common
46
reliance. To avail itself of the presumption, Connecticut Retirement
tendered evidence showing that Amgen’s stock traded in an efficient
47
market and that Amgen’s alleged misstatements were public.
Connecticut Retirement argues that because the misrepresentations
were reflected in the market price, common reliance should be
presumed for any investors who sold or purchased Amgen stock
48
during the class period.
Amgen attempted to defeat class certification on two grounds.
First, Amgen claimed that the fraud-on-the-market presumption also
requires a showing that the misrepresentations were material, because
immaterial statements, by definition, do not affect stock price in an
49
efficient market. Second, Amgen, arguing the “truth-on-the-market”
defense to Basic’s presumption of reliance, demanded the opportunity
to rebut the presumption by showing that the truth behind each of
Amgen’s alleged misstatements had already entered the market and,
50
consequently, could not have affected the stock price.
The district court rejected both of Amgen’s arguments and
granted certification because both the materiality of the alleged
misrepresentations and the opportunity to rebut the presumption of

44. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a), 23(b)(3).
45. Id.
46. Conn. Ret., 660 F.3d at 1173.
47. Id. The court characterizes the efficient market hypothesis as a theory asserting that
“[t]he price of a stock traded in an efficient market fully reflects all publicly available
information about the company and its business.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, Basic’s
presumption only requires evidence of market efficiency and the public availability of
information. Id.
48. Id. at 1174.
49. Id. at 1175 (noting Amgen’s argument that if the stock price is not affected, “no buyer
could claim to have been misled by an artificially inflated stock price,” thus defeating the fraudon-the-market presumption of reliance).
50. Id. at 1174; see Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248–49 (1988) (describing one
example of how defendants can break the causal connection between the misrepresentations
and the price received or paid by the plaintiff (thus rebutting the presumption of reliance) by
showing that the truth behind the misrepresentations had “credibly entered the market and
dissipated the effects of the misstatements [on the market price]”).
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reliance were issues on the merits and inappropriate to consider at
51
the certification stage. Amgen appealed the certification order to the
Ninth Circuit. The court granted Amgen’s appeal, acknowledging that
the question of whether a putative securities fraud plaintiff class must
prove materiality to avail itself of the fraud-on-the-market
52
presumption remains unsettled.
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s class certification
order for abuse of discretion—any error of law is considered a per se
53
abuse of discretion. The court joined the Third and Seventh Circuits,
holding that to procure certification, a putative plaintiff class must
prove (1) market efficiency, and (2) the public nature of the
54
misrepresentations. The court decided that materiality, however, only
55
needs to be alleged. According to the court, materiality is purely a
merits-based issue that cannot be considered during class
56
certification.
The Ninth Circuit refused to consider materiality during class
certification because merits-based issues can be considered, at
57
earliest, during summary judgment. If Amgen’s misrepresentations
were immaterial, then the plaintiff class will be unable to prove a
violation of Rule 10b-5 regardless of whether the plaintiff class could
58
make use of the fraud-on-the-market presumption. If, on the other
hand, the plaintiff class were required to prove materiality at the
certification stage and failed to do so, then each plaintiff would be
59
forced to prove reliance individually.
However, the same
immateriality that defeated class certification would deal a fatal blow
51. Conn. Ret., 660 F.3d at 1174.
52. See id. (rejecting Plaintiffs’ argument that the issue had already been decided in the
Ninth Circuit, because the cases Plaintiffs cite were not Section 10(b) securities fraud actions).
53. Id. at 1174–75.
54. Id. at 1172 (declaring the court’s conformity to the Third and Seventh Circuits’ reading
of Basic); In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2011) (“To invoke the fraud-onthe-market presumption of reliance, plaintiffs must show they traded shares in an efficient
market and the misrepresentation at issue became public.” (internal citations omitted));
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010).
55. Conn. Ret., 660 F.3d at 1172.
56. See id. at 1175 (distinguishing materiality as an element on the merits of a securities
fraud claim, whereas the fraud-on-the-market elements of market efficiency and public
availability are not part of the core elements of a securities fraud claim).
57. Id.
58. Id. (noting that a successful Rule 10b-5 claim requires proof of materiality).
59. Id.
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to the individual claims on the merits because materiality is a
60
“standalone merits element” in all Rule 10b-5 claims. All the
individual claims would essentially be “dead on arrival.” This common
mortality among individual plaintiffs’ claims is exactly what makes
class treatment appropriate; the critical question in the Rule 23
61
inquiry is whether the plaintiffs’ claims will stand or fall together. By
contrast, the two enumerated predicates required to invoke the fraudon-the-market
presumption
(market
efficiency
and
the
misrepresentation’s public availability) do not yield this common
mortality among plaintiffs’ claims because they are not elements of
the substantive securities fraud claim; if the class fails to show market
efficiency, an individual securities fraud claim can still succeed on the
62
merits.
63
The Ninth Circuit sided with the Third and Seventh Circuits,
64
declining to follow opposing holdings from three other circuits. The
Ninth Circuit credited the opposing circuits’ rationales to a
misreading of the following footnote in Basic: “The Court of Appeals
held that in order to invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must allege
65
and prove . . . that the misrepresentations were material.” While the
three other circuits interpreted this footnote to mean that plaintiffs
must allege and prove the materiality of misrepresentations in order
to successfully plead the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the footnote to reflect only an objective
interpretation of the lower court’s opinion, not the Supreme Court’s
66
adoption of it.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s certification order,
holding that Connecticut Retirement did not need to prove

60. Id. (“[T]he plaintiffs cannot both fail to prove materiality [at the certification stage] yet
still have a viable claim for which they would need to prove reliance individually.”).
61. See id. (“[W]hat matters to class certification . . . [is] the capacity of a classwide
proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” (quoting
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011))).
62. See id. (pointing out that if plaintiffs failed to prove that the securities market was
efficient and the misstatements were public, the effect would only bar the plaintiffs’ use of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance; however, plaintiffs can still prove reliance
individually, and their claims are not automatically “dead on arrival”).
63. Id. at 1176 (citing In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2011);
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010)).
64. Id. (citing In re Salomon Analyst Metromedia Litig., 544 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2008);
Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir. 2007); In re
PolyMedica Corp. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 1, 8 n.11 (1st Cir. 2005)).
65. Id. (quoting Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988)).
66. See id. (siding with the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of Basic’s footnote 27).
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materiality to avail itself of the fraud-on-the-market presumption and
that Amgen could not rebut the presumption by attacking materiality
67
during the certification proceedings. After the court denied a re68
hearing en banc, Amgen petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the
69
Supreme Court and on June 11, 2012, the Court granted certiorari.
The questions presented were: (1) whether the district court must
require proof of materiality before certifying a plaintiff class based on
the fraud-on-the-market theory; and (2) whether, in such a case, the
district court must allow the defendant to present evidence rebutting
the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market theory before certifying a
70
plaintiff class based on that theory.
V. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioners’ Argument
Amgen claims that the Ninth Circuit disobeyed Basic’s core
principles. First, materiality is an essential element to Basic’s fraud71
on-the-market presumption. Therefore, Rule 23 requires materiality
to be established at class certification for plaintiffs to use the
72
presumption to satisfy common reliance. Second, because Basic dealt
with class certification, the opportunity it bestowed upon defendants
to rebut the presumption must be granted at certification—including
73
the opportunity to refute materiality. Third, preserving the issue of
materiality until adjudication on a claim’s merits encumbers judicial
economy because all claims will inevitably fail without materiality,
74
rendering any proceedings after certification futile. Furthermore,
leaving materiality out of the certification stage imposes unfair
pressure upon defendants because once a class has been certified,
75
defendants rarely have any choice but to settle. Certifying a class
without proof of materiality will force defendants to settle even

67. Id. at 1177.
68. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 2.
69. Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (U.S. June 11, 2012)
(No. 11-1085).
70. Brief for Petitioners at i, Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, No. 111085 (U.S. Aug. 8, 2012).
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id. at 9.
73. Id. at 12.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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76

frivolous claims.
Amgen argues that materiality is necessary to trigger the fraudon-the-market presumption. Reviewing Basic’s holding, Amgen
contends that the rebuttable presumption of reliance could not
survive without establishing that the misrepresentations were
77
material. Only material representations can move the price of a
stock up or down; by contrast, immaterial representations by
78
definition do not affect the stock price. “Absent materiality,” Amgen
asserts, “the fundamental premise of Basic is not established, because
an essential link between the misstatement and the plaintiff is entirely
79
missing.” Amgen interprets the Court’s consistent inclusion of the
concept of materiality in its subsequent explications of the Basic
holding to indicate that materiality must be considered before
80
triggering the presumption of reliance. Amgen contends that
Halliburton’s recognition that the presumption of reliance is partly
based on price impact directly supports its claim that materiality
81
cannot be separated from the fraud-on-the-market presumption.
Since materiality is vital to Basic’s presumption of reliance,
Amgen argues that it must be proved at class certification like all
82
other fraud-on-the-market predicates. In Amgen’s view, it does not
matter that materiality is also a merits-based element, a fact that the
83
Ninth Circuit strongly emphasizes. In a claim alleging fraud-on-themarket, Basic’s presumption is essential to both class certification—to

76. Id.
77. See id. at 17 (“Without materiality . . . there is no basis to presume an effect on the
market price—and therefore presume class-wide reliance on a distorted price—even if the other
fraud-on-the-market predicates are met.”)
78. See id. (“[I]n an efficient market the concept of materiality translates into information
that alters the price of the firm’s stock.” (emphasis added) (quoting Oran v. Stafford, 2 F.3d 275,
282 (3d Cir. 2000))).
79. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 5, at 20.
80. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 18–19; see, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo,
544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (unanimously citing Basic as having approved a “presum[ption] that
the price of a publicly traded share reflects a material misrepresentation and that plaintiffs have
relied upon that [material] misrepresentation” (emphasis added)).
81. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 19 (noting that in Halliburton, the Court
unanimously described Basic’s fundamental premise as an investor’s reliance on a
misrepresentation “so long as it was reflected in the market price” when the investor trades
(emphasis added)).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 36 (differentiating the certification inquiry for materiality from the merits
inquiry, and arguing that materiality’s status as a distinct element of a Rule 10b-5 claim is
irrelevant to its requirement under Rule 23’s analysis of whether common issues predominate
on the element of reliance).
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prove common reliance—and to the actual merits of the claim—to
84
satisfy actual reliance. Thus, plaintiffs must prove all elements of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption, including materiality, during
85
certification proceedings. That plaintiffs will inevitably be required
to prove the fraud-on-the-market predicates again during trial does
86
not relieve them of their certification burden.
Amgen contends that requiring proof of materiality before
87
certification is consistent with the Court’s decision in Dukes.
According to Amgen, Dukes’s edict, that plaintiffs bear the burden of
proving all elements under Rule 23 and that courts have the duty to
rigorously ensure the rule has been satisfied, mandates a full
88
examination into the Basic presumption. Amgen argues that the
Ninth Circuit defies the Dukes holding by extricating materiality from
the certification inquiry simply because materiality is a merits
89
element. Materiality is necessary to the fraud-on-the-market
90
presumption, which is necessary to show common reliance.
91
Therefore, materiality must be determined at certification.
Furthermore, because the elements underlying the presumption of
reliance must be satisfied before the plaintiffs can proceed as a class,
Amgen argues that courts must afford defendants the opportunity to
92
rebut the presumption at the certification stage. The Basic Court
added a “powerful weapon to plaintiffs’ arsenal in securities fraud
litigation,” but only on the condition that defendants also had the

84. Id. at 37; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011) (noting
that in securities fraud claims, plaintiffs seeking class certification must prove the predicates to
the fraud-on-the-market presumption, and “they will surely have to prove [the predicates] again
at trial in order to make out their case on the merits”).
85. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 36.
86. See id. (asserting that a Rule 23 determination is made “before, and independently of,
any merits determination” and that it “provides no exception” for subjects merely because their
litigation at certification could affect the claim’s merits).
87. Id. at 19.
88. See id. (citing Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551) (relying on Dukes’s principles that the “party
seeking class certification must prove that the requirements of Rule 23 are in fact satisfied” and
that district courts may certify a class “only if it concludes, after a rigorous analysis, that the
prerequisites of Rule 23 have been satisfied.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
89. See id. at 35–36 (reiterating the Dukes Court’s findings that class certification may
involve “considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the
plaintiffs’ cause of action” (quoting Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551)).
90. Id. at 36.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 40 (arguing that it makes no sense to force defendants to wait until summary
judgment adjudication or trial to show that a plaintiff class should not have been certified in the
first place).
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“meaningful opportunity to rebut the presumption.” Amgen argues
that the opportunity to rebut the presumption would have no force if
94
rebuttal were postponed until after class certification. According to
Amgen, the Ninth Circuit’s proposal of delayed rebuttal requires
courts “to initially hear evidence regarding class certification from
only one side . . . inevitably lead[ing] to certification in some cases in
95
which it is improper.”
Amgen makes various policy arguments supporting its position,
urging the Court to consider the unfair leverage that class
certification grants to plaintiffs in settlement negotiations and the
potential for waste of judicial resources. First, because materiality also
needs to be litigated to prove class-wide reliance, refusing to consider
it before class certification will waste judicial resources and accrue
96
unnecessary costs. Second, Amgen warns of the risk of “in terrorem
settlements” because the massive costs associated with discovery in
97
securities class actions induce defendants to settle. Failing to
evaluate materiality before granting certification will often mean that
“defendants are forced to settle without any testing of the materiality
of the alleged misstatements . . . without any showing that class
98
certification was warranted in the first place.” Finally, every case in
which the alleged misrepresentations are not material inevitably fails
on the merits. Therefore, the increased costs of proceeding on a classwide basis after certification are wasted where materiality cannot be
99
proven.
B. Respondent’s Argument
Connecticut Retirement replies on two fronts: first, countering
arguments based on the “common question” requirement of Rule 23,
and second, noting judicial interests and policy concerns underlying
the class action tool. Connecticut Retirement’s brief closely tracks the
100
reasoning of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits. First, materiality is a
93. Id. at 41.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 41–42.
96. See id. at 27 (referring to a study demonstrating that judges spent over five times as
many hours on certified class actions as on putative class actions that were never certified).
97. Id. at 24–25; cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558 (2007) (adopting the
higher “plausibility” pleading and noting that frivolous suits present an “in terrorem” threat
that may increase settlement values).
98. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 70, at 26.
99. Id.
100. Brief for Respondent at 18–21, Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, No.
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non-issue for certification because whether or not a misrepresentation
is material, it will still impart the same effect on all class members’
claims; thus, the common issue of reliance is present as required by
101
Rule 23. Second, the Dukes holding does not apply to the present
102
case because materiality is not an element of certification. Third,
requiring proof of materiality at the certification stage, before formal
discovery, would impose too great of a burden upon securities fraud
103
plaintiffs. Finally, allowing defendants to present a truth-on-themarket defense to defeat certification would be an issue on the merits
104
and inappropriate at certification.
Connecticut Retirement opens with the assertion that because
Amgen did not challenge that Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites were met,
the only Rule 23 requirement at issue is whether “questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over any questions
105
affecting only individual members.” The crucial question for class
certification, therefore, turns on whether plaintiffs have established
106
similarity in their claims. Thus, Connecticut Retirement argues that
proof of materiality at class certification is only required if absent
such proof, individual questions would predominate over common
107
questions. Because determining materiality is an objective standard
and “does not relate to the characteristics of any particular investor’s
subjective views about the importance of the information,” a
misrepresentation’s materiality or immateriality will affect all
108
investors in a similar fashion.
Echoing the Ninth Circuit,
Connecticut Retirement asserts that since materiality or immateriality
will categorically affect all plaintiffs in the same way, the plaintiffs’
109
claims stand and fall together, exhibiting a resultant similarity.
Because the misrepresentations’ alleged immateriality will still

11-1085 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2012); Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., 660 F.3d 1170,
1175–76 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1085);
Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010).
101. Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 18.
102. See id. at 19 (“[R]equiring proof of materiality for class certification goes beyond what
is required by Rule 23 and this Court’s Rule 23 precedents.”).
103. Id. at 20.
104. See id. at 21 (claiming that evidence rebutting materiality cannot be considered at the
certification stage because it defeats the claim on its merits, not on the issue of predominance of
common questions).
105. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 26.
106. Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 26.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id. at 24 (referring to the “reasonable investor” standard).
109. Id. at 25.
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maintain the “common questions” status of the class, a showing that a
misrepresentation was definitively material is not required at
110
certification under Rule 23.
Connecticut Retirement relies on the same logic to counter
Amgen’s claim that proof of a misrepresentation’s materiality is a
prerequisite for triggering the fraud-on-the-market presumption for
the purposes of certification. The fraud-on-the-market presumption
assumes that the efficient market price will reflect any material
misrepresentations. Consequently, reliance on those material
misrepresentations may be presumed by the buyer’s reliance on the
111
integrity of the market price. Evidence that the misrepresentation
was immaterial and consequently not reflected in the market price
will disable any individual investor in the class from proving
112
reliance. Thus, reliance via the fraud-on-the-market presumption is a
question common to the class because the same set of evidentiary
113
facts causes the plaintiffs’ claims to stand and fall together. Unlike
Amgen, which reads Basic to establish materiality as a predicate to
the fraud-on-the-market presumption, Connecticut Retirement
interprets Basic only as listing materiality as an element on the merits
114
for the court below to consider.
Responding to Amgen’s argument in the alternative, that Dukes
allows—in fact commands—judges to consider issues of merit within
courts’ “rigorous analyses,” Connecticut Retirement reads Dukes in a
much narrower fashion, arguing that the Dukes holding was merely
an attempt to stabilize courts overreaching and under-reaching Rule
115
23 standards. Dukes only directs judges to ensure that the elements
required by Rule 23 must be considered during class certification,
116
even if it means crossing into issues overlapping with the merits.
According to Connecticut Retirement, Dukes does not permit the

110. Id.; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131 (2009) (“[T]he question of whether the class exhibits some fatal
similarity—a failure of proof as to all class members on an element of their cause of action—is
properly engaged as a matter of summary judgment.”).
111. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 27 (explaining the fraud-on-the-market
theory).
112. Id. at 29.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 42–43.
115. See id. at 29–30 (citing Dukes as an example of the Court preventing courts from
under-reaching into merits issues required by Rule 23, while also noting that other courts
overreach into merits issues that are unnecessary under Rule 23).
116. Id. at 23.
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reverse: courts may not consider questions of merit during class
certification proceedings that are outside the bounds of Rule 23’s
117
requirements. Connecticut Retirement thus points to the current
case as an example of overreaching that contravenes Dukes’s
118
holding. A determination of materiality for the purposes of the
fraud-on-the-market presumption is not required by Rule 23, and
119
instead is an issue for summary judgment at the earliest.
As a matter of policy, Connecticut Retirement urges the Court not
to request proof of materiality at certification proceedings because
such a rule would require courts “to consider a particularly fact120
intensive issue at an early stage of the case, before full discovery.”
Because the burden of proof at the certification stage is the same for
the plaintiffs as it is during trial, plaintiffs run the risk of having
certification denied even though the discovery process after
121
certification would reveal evidence of materiality. Responding to
Amgen’s argument that certification without requiring proof of
material misrepresentations would lead to “in terrorem” settlements,
Connecticut Retirement claims the Private Securities Litigation
122
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) has already addressed this danger by
enacting procedural safeguards for defendants to protect against
123
frivolous claims.
Connecticut Retirement further lists studies
conducted after the PSLRA that indicate settlement amounts are not
124
exorbitant.
117. See id. at 30 (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Common Answers for Class Certification, 63
VAND. L. REV. 149, 168 (2010)) (asserting that when courts consider issues during class
certification that are more appropriate for summary judgment, they commit the flipside of the
error the Supreme Court corrected in Dukes).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 20.
121. See id. at 36 (“Amgen’s position thus creates a significant risk that courts will fail to
certify federal securities fraud class actions even in cases where the evidence after full discovery
would show that the misstatements were material.”).
122. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006)).
123. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 39–40 (claiming that the PSLRA was
enacted specifically to address “extortionate settlements” being “extracted” from companies by
raising the pleading standard for scienter and imposing various other procedural requirements
on securities fraud plaintiffs).
124. See id. at 45 (citing ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, CLEARINGHOUSE &
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS SETTLEMENTS: 2011 REVIEW AND
ANALYSIS 2 (2012), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/Settlements/REVIEW_19952011/Settlements_Through_12_2011.pdf) (relying on empirical data that demonstrate the
median settlement amount in 2011 was $5.8 million, and that more than half of post-PSLRA
securities fraud cases have settled for less than $10 million, while eighty percent of post-PSLRA
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Challenging Amgen’s request that the Court allow defendants to
rebut materiality and the fraud-on-the-market presumption through a
truth-on-the-market defense, Connecticut Retirement reiterates the
class-wide effect argument. Connecticut Retirement argues that if the
truth were publicly available and misrepresentations could not have
been said to alter the stock price, the immateriality would still apply
125
to all putative class members’ claims. A truth-on-the-market defense
126
would cause the plaintiffs’ claims to stand or fall as one. Moreover,
Connecticut Retirement contends that a truth-on-the-market defense
goes straight to merits-based issues because it proves no one was
defrauded, and is therefore inappropriate for consideration during
127
class certification proceedings. Finally, Connecticut Retirement
points out that there are alternative ways to defeat the presumption
at class certification, either by rebutting the predicates of market
128
efficiency or the misrepresentations’ public availability.
VI. ANALYSIS AND LIKELY DISPOSITION
The Supreme Court’s answer to whether materiality is an essential
element of class certification has great implications for the future of
securities fraud class actions. Because securities fraud class actions
rarely proceed to trial on the merits, the Supreme Court’s decision
will likely have a significant effect on settlement negotiations. A
decision for Connecticut Retirement will allow investors to effectively
guarantee substantial settlement amounts after certification; a
decision for Amgen will hinder shareholders from using the class
action tool to keep fraudulent business practices at bay. If materiality
is required for Basic’s presumption, courts will be faced with the same
daunting task at certification that they struggle with during merits
proceedings: unraveling whether the price change was caused by
fraudulent or legitimate statements. The Court’s decision likely will
echo the same practical and policy-oriented considerations espoused
by Basic and lead to the adoption of a moderate approach in order to
maintain a balance between business and shareholder interests.

cases have settled for less than $25 million).
125. See id. at 51–52 (“[D]isproving materiality would not demonstrate the existence of
individual questions; it would negate the elements of materiality and reliance for all class
members alike.”).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 52–53.
128. Id. at 53.
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A. Future Implications for Publicly Held Companies and Their
Shareholders
If the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
businesses will continue to face considerable financial obligations to
certified investor classes who may or may not have legally meritorious
claims. Aggregating shareholders’ claims can lead to threats of
129
staggering potential losses if the class prevails on the merits. Rather
than risk the prospect of financial ruin, defendants are quick to settle
for amounts disproportionate to the merits of the shareholders’
130
claims. This only invites more frivolous lawsuits. Defendants are
frequently at the plaintiffs’ mercy after class certification. Without a
requirement of materiality at the certification stage, defendants’ only
options are to settle and avoid additional costs, or wait until
adjudication on summary judgment to test the claim’s legitimacy.
If the Court sides with Amgen, plaintiffs will be forced to
assemble a case proving materiality prior to actual discovery. Plaintiffs
are already encumbered by the requirement to plead facts supporting
131
loss causation and Basic’s certification requirement of expert
132
evidence proving market efficiency. An additional requirement of
proof of materiality before certification may add considerably to
plaintiffs’ burden. If this were not already a significant burden to class
action litigation, plaintiffs would have to prove materiality by a
preponderance of the evidence, a burden of proof that is higher than
the standard by which plaintiffs need to prove a genuine issue of
133
material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment. This would
134
act as an additional barrier to class action litigation. Front-loading

129. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482
F.3d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 2007) (reviewing a district court’s certification order in which plaintiffs
alleged damages totaling $40 billion).
130. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits,
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1302 (2002) (“[L]ack of attention to the merits make[s] the class action an
attractive vehicle for frivolous suits.”).
131. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (holding that plaintiffs must
present facts in order to adequately allege that the fraud proximately caused actual economic
loss, not just that the misrepresentations inflated the stock price).
132. See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that because
market efficiency is the cornerstone behind Basic’s presumption, Rule 23 requires judges to
weigh, if necessary, the conflicting expert testimony on market efficiency before certification).
133. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 100, at 32 (noting that some courts believe the
Rule 23 requirements are subject to a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard).
134. See Brief for Public Citizen, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 13,
Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and Trust Funds, No. 11-1085 (U.S. Sept. 27, 2012) (noting the
advisory committee notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which state that allowing
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the lengthy, fact-based inquiries surrounding materiality before
certification can hinder or even discourage investors from pursuing
legitimate securities fraud claims, undercutting Basic’s intended
purpose. Such obstacles would prevent plaintiffs from keeping
businesses in check, thereby undermining the deterrent effect of
private securities fraud claims.
B. Challenges for Trial Courts Assessing Materiality Under Basic’s
Presumption
A discussion of whether materiality is a predicate to triggering
Basic’s presumption could force the Court to plunge into deeply
tangled issues, such as the reliability of the market efficiency
hypothesis and Basic’s fraud-on-the-market presumption. Under
Basic’s presumption, courts need to determine whether fraudulent
statements cause a plaintiff’s injury based on the impact that such
135
statements had on stock price. However, an impersonal market
continually absorbs large amounts of public information. Thus,
proving the actual impact of a particular statement is very difficult,
136
and sometimes impossible. In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,
the Court addressed requirements for proving loss causation in the
context of fraud-on-the-market claims, holding that evidence of price
137
inflation resulting from misstatements was insufficient. Instead,
plaintiffs needed to have shown that corrective disclosures also
caused a price drop to connect the defendant’s fraud to the plaintiff’s
138
economic loss. Dura’s narrow holding that price inflation alone is
insufficient has left lower courts struggling to find loss causation when
139
a price drop may not be the direct result of a corrective disclosure.
Dura and its progeny demonstrate the difficulty of disaggregating
causes of price impact in an open market. If materiality is held to be

controlled discovery to determine certification would cause significant expansion to meritsbased discovery during preliminary certification proceedings).
135. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (justifying a presumption of
reliance because the misstatements have been disseminated into the market and are reflected in
the market price).
136. 544 U.S. 336 (2005).
137. Id. at 342.
138. Id. at 347.
139. See, e.g., Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 10-15910, 2012 WL 3854795, at *3 (11th
Cir. Sept. 6, 2012) (per curiam) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for
defendants because plaintiffs could not establish that it was the corrective disclosures that
caused the price drop, when the disclosures were bundled with multiple pieces of nonfraudulent information that also could have caused the identified price drop).
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essential to Basic’s presumption, then courts and litigants will face the
challenge of unraveling misleading information from the bundle of all
140
information that may have contributed to a price change.
Fraudulent statements and corrective disclosures are frequently
released as part of larger packages of information, increasing the
difficulty of proving a specific statement’s materiality. If the
misrepresentation precedes a stock price increase, courts would need
to determine whether it was the misrepresentation—rather than any
legitimate good news that was released with it—that inflated the stock
price. By contrast, if plaintiffs attempt to show the materiality of the
misrepresentation by pointing to a price drop following corrective
disclosures, the price drop could be the result of other bad news
bundled with the corrective disclosure.
C. An Adaptable Line of Precedent
The relevant issues under Basic’s fraud-on-the-market
presumption are deeply connected to the economic and policy
interests of both public companies and investors. As this is a relatively
new area of legal doctrine saturated with ambiguities, the Supreme
Court will likely be sharply divided on the issue. The best precedential
indicators of the how the Supreme Court will rule come from its 2011
decisions in Halliburton and Dukes.
Halliburton’s precedent can substantiate a decision for either
party. For Connecticut Retirement, direct language from the
Halliburton decision suggests that the Court may preclude
determination of materiality at the class certification stage. Like loss
causation, materiality is “distinct” from actual reliance, and is a
141
distinct element of a Rule 10b-5 claim. The Court may find that
materiality remains distinct from the presumed reliance required by
Basic’s presumption, and is unnecessary for plaintiffs to establish in
order to invoke the presumption.
A strong argument for Amgen is the Court’s distinction in
Halliburton between reliance—or transaction causation—and loss
causation. Logic does not support making loss causation a
precondition to the presumption of reliance because reliance is

140. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 184 (identifying problems with showing that the
misrepresentation caused the price change when other information, such as good news or bad
news, accompanies misrepresentations or corrective disclosures).
141. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011).
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142

preliminary to any economic loss. However, materiality, unlike loss
causation, is not as easily distinguishable from reliance. The primary
justification for presuming reliance is the idea that an efficient market
reflects all publicly available information; investors depend on the
market’s efficiency to account for information the investor would
143
otherwise rely on individually. The Court’s emphasis on the efficient
market hypothesis in Dukes, Halliburton, and Dura arguably may
have contained an implicit understanding that only if
misrepresentations are material can they be reflected in the efficient
144
market price.
The Dukes decision has demonstrated the Court’s willingness to
entertain consideration of the merits at the certification stage.
However, Amgen faces the argument that Dukes is distinguishable
from the present case, and its holding does not apply with the same
force to securities fraud claims. The Court may find that Dukes
necessitated the merits inquiry because of the claim’s nature as an
145
employment discrimination suit.
A class member’s personal
discrimination by a company, as in Dukes, requires a much more
individualized, fact-laden inquiry than the impersonal market Basic
was intended to address.
D. The Opportunity for Rebuttal: An Equitable Compromise
The Court’s way out may be to focus on Amgen’s second
argument: that defendants must have the opportunity to rebut the
fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance before certification,
regardless of whether plaintiffs must prove materiality. Accounting
for the considerable future impact on both parties and the Court’s
interest in following its own precedent, the Justices may adopt a
142. Loss causation requires proof that the misrepresentation that affected the stock price
also caused subsequent economic loss through a later decline in value, not merely because the
investor relied upon the artificially inflated price on the date of purchase. Id. at 2186.
143. See id. (“Basic’s fundamental premise [is that] an investor presumptively relies on a
misrepresentation so long as it was reflected in the market price at the time of his transaction.”).
144. See, e.g., id. at 2185 (“P]laintiffs must demonstrate that the alleged misrepresentations
were publicly known (else how would the market take them into account?) . . . .” (emphasis
added)); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (“[Basic] nonconclusively
presume[s] that the price of a publicly traded share reflects a material misrepresentation and
that plaintiffs have relied upon that misrepresentation as long as they would not have bought
the share in its absence.” (emphasis added)).
145. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011) (“In this case, proof of
commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents’ merits contention that Wal-Mart engages in
a pattern or practice of discrimination . . . [because] the crux of the [Title VII claim] inquiry is
the reason for a particular employment decision.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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hybrid approach similar to the Third Circuit’s practice of not
requiring proof of materiality from plaintiffs at certification, but
instead allowing defendants to affirmatively rebut the fraud-on-the146
market presumption at the certification stage. To remain consistent
with the “rebuttable presumption” framework established by Basic,
the Court will likely require defendants to bear both the burden of
production and the burden of persuasion if defendants wish to avail
themselves of the rebuttal right. This approach would allow the Court
to avoid placing undue evidentiary demands upon the plaintiffs at
certification, while still allowing defendants to use the defense Basic
handed down in parcel with its fraud-on-the-market presumption.
VII. CONCLUSION
Amgen promises to clarify the uncertainty regarding Basic’s fraudon-the-market presumption. Because of Amgen’s significant potential
impact on future securities fraud litigation, the Court is likely to adopt
an approach that does not require an initial showing of materiality,
but would afford defendants an opportunity to rebut the fraud-onthe-market presumption of reliance before class certification.
Nevertheless, there is no easy way for the Supreme Court to endorse
one side of the circuit split without significantly affecting the
landscape of securities class actions. Whatever the decision may be,
lower courts will undoubtedly struggle to rein in any polarizing effects
that the Court’s decision may have on parties’ advantages in securities
fraud litigation.

146. See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 648–49 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that while
plaintiffs do not need to prove materiality to trigger the fraud-on-the-market presumption,
defendants have the opportunity to rebut the presumption before certification).

